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THE COMPATIBILITY OF FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM IN
CRIMINOLOGY: COMMENTS ON AN ALLEGED PROBLEM
DANIEL GLASER*
Perspectives widely prevalent in modern philoso-
phy suggest that the issue raised by Professor Schafer
is not a problem, for free will and determinism are
complementary rather than conflicting ways of ana-
lyzing behavior, Indeed, every person interprets the
conduct of self or others through both of these two
primarily linguistic frames of reference, implying
free will to ascribe conscious motives but assuming
determinism to explain behavior as the product of
genetics or of life experiences. As one philosopher has
observed, "the argument that we cannot formulate
laws governing human behavior because human
beings are free to choose for themselves what they
will do . . . [is] . . . one on which over the centuries
a literature has accumulated as dubious as it is
vast." ' The basis for such dismissal of the issue
becomes evident if we examine the functions of
language in accounting for human conduct, including
acts called criminal.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING
David Hume, in his classic writings, pointed out
that causal determinism is never directly observed,
but is inferred by humans from their observations.
We can see the succession of one event or condition
by another, and their contiguity, he noted, but we
can only infer a necessary connection between them
to say that the antecedent phenomenon caused that
which we call its effect. 2
Modern philosophy stresses the role of language in
what we distinguish as separate events or conditions
and in ways of conceiving causal connections. This is
illustrated by the diverse modes of accounting for a
plant's growth: an uneducated gardener says only
that it had good soil with plenty of water and
sunshine; a plant physiologist specifies the chemistry
of this nutrition and the functions of various compo-
nents of root, stem and leaf; a biophysicist traces the
* Professor of Sociology, University of Southern Cali-
fornia. These comments on Professor Schafer's article, The
Problem of Free Will in Criminology, were solicited by the
Journal's editors.
'A. KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 121 (1964).
'D. HUME, 1 TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, Part II
(1740).
energy transformations of photosynthesis, expressing
this in complex mathematical formulations. All three
can be scientifically correct, since each interpretation
may lead to predictions that can be tested and found
valid by rigorous experiment or by systematic obser-
vation of variations in nature. Each of these explain-
ers has learned a different language for indicating
observable aspects of events and for inferring causal
relationships, and each -of these explanations is more
practical than the others for some types of setting and
concern; all may usefully coexist.
The meaning of the world is constructed socially
by humans when they communicate with each other
to describe and explain their experiences. Language
itself is a social product, of course, and the words that
people learn largely mold, and certainly limit their
interpretation of events; if they were born 2000 years
ago or reared today by an illiterate isolated tribe of a
remote Amazonian jungle, knowledge and language
would lead to descriptions and explanations of
natural events quite different from those acquired in
today's science courses. This conclusion about social
construction and cultural limitations of knowledge
also applies to explanations for human behivior, but
with some special complications.
MODES OF ACCOUNTING FOR HUMAN CONDUCT
In learning verbal interpretations for our own
behavior and that of others, from infancy on we
acquire several alternative types of language, some
similar to and some distinctly different from the
terms we use to explain inanimate events. Quite
early we learn that some conduct is good and some
bad; we thus acquire a language of moral justifica-
tion for our acts and for assessing the moral character
of others by their behavior. This language, like that
of physical causality, also varies somewhat with the
social group in which we are reared or with which
we subsequently affiliate ourselves; for example, our
moral assessment of bigamy probably would be
different if we were reared in polygamous tribes
instead of in today's United States, but even within
our own society moral justifications for behavior vary
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with any contrast in ethical norms from one group to
the next.
The language of moral assessment in accounting
for human conduct is one form of what C. Wright
Mills called "vocabularies of motive."' His phrase
refers to the words used for explaining acts by what is
inferred to be the purpose of the actor. For example,
we may explain the fact that people work by saying
they do it to earn a living, to keep from being bored,
for the exercise, or because they consider idleness or
dependence on others to be evil. Explanations of
events that ascribe purposes or morality to the actors,
however, do not fit nonhuman phenomena, such as
the growth of a plant, except to those with animistic
conceptions of the nonhuman world, for example,
those who believe that a plant will not grow if it has
been angered by its gardener. Vocabularies of
motive, like causal determinism words, vary from
one culture to another and from one period or group
to another within cultures. Thus psychoanalytic
thought inspires many people to account for behavior
by ascribing unconscious motives to the actors, but
large segments of our society reject such explana-
tions, and thousands of other conceptual systems
have developed over the years for ascribing causes to
conduct.
In addition to moral and motivational modes of
accounting for human behavior, we employ determi-
nistic explanations comparable to those with which
we interpret nonhuman events. Thus we say that a
child can't read because she was never properly
taught, that he disobeys because he was not ade-
quately punished for prior disobedience, that she
shivers because this muscle movement is a reflexive
maintenance of body temperature, or that he has
heretical ideas because he was not sent to a parochial
school. Even those who ascribe free will to human
conduct thus imply determinism, in diverse ways, in
many of their explanations for the behavior of others,
and especially in their prescriptions for changing
someone else's conduct. Furthermore, just as the
contrasting ways of accounting for growth of a plant
can usefully coexist, each serving different functions,
so explanations of human behavior as the free pursuit
of moral or other motives are compatible with views
of conduct as the effects of causal determination.
'Mills, Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,
5 AMI. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 904 (1940), reprinted in
POWER, POLrrICs AND PEOPLE: THE COLLECTED ESSAYS
OF C. WRIGrr MILLS (I. Horowitz, ed. 1963) [hereinafter
cited as COLLECTED ESSAYS]. See also K. BURKE, PERMA-
NENCE AND CHANGE (2d ed. 1954); K. BURKE, A GRAMMAR
OF MOTIVES (1945).
Each of these perspectives contributes to a different
type of social need.
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DETERMINISM
As indicated, neither the necessary connection in
causal explanations nor the ideas of good and evil in
moral justifications are directly perceived; both may
be inferred from observations of succession and
contiguity in events, but they usually are taught to us
by others and accepted by us on faith. They are all
social constructions, each requiring the evolution of
an appropriate language.
One can only speculate on the origins of cultural
phenomena, but society's need for widely-shared
causal determinism ideas as well as for conceptions of
good and evil is readily inferred-they both contrib-
ute to order and predictability in human life. It seems
probable that the coordinated activity of many people
in different specialized roles that constitutes society
as we know it, that produces our culture and
whatever material standard of living and degree of
security we enjoy, would be much more difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve without the widespread
sharing of many causal and moral concepts. A
function of the law is to enhance the pervasiveness of
such concepts in controlling conduct.
The idea that we have free will to choose between
good and evil conduct, hence personal responsibility
for our acts, is validated introspectively by our
subjective experience of thought. Philosophers John
Dewey and George H. Mead, and many others, have
pointed out that: (1) thinking is a reaction to
problems by imagining and commenting to ourselves
on their alternative solutions before, or instead of,
overtly acting to solve them; (2) such thinking occurs
to some degree whenever habitual or reflexive behav-
ior is blocked by circumstances or by our inhibiting
the behavior after imaginatively anticipating
unpleasant consequences from it. Mead stresses that
the events and conditions we contemplate, as well as
our verbal constructs for explaining or justifying
them, acquire meaning for us only through our
focusing on them and interpreting them in the covert
role-taking and subjective communication with
ourselves and with imagined others that comprises
thought. "
'J. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922); G.
H. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY (1934). See also P.
BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY (1966); H. BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM
(1969); T. SHIBUTANI, SOCIETY AND PERSONALITY Chap. 6
(1961);'0. WAGNER, ALFRED SCHULTZ, ON PHENOMENOL-
OGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS (1970).
The assumption that behavior will be inhibited if
unpleasant consequences are anticipated from it may
rationalize a government's holding people responsi-
ble for their deeds, hence trying to deter law-violat-
ing behavior by punishing it. The effectiveness of the
policies of deterrence that the concept of responsibili-
ty evokes are empirically testable, but the metaphysi-
cal issue of whether people "really are" responsible
is not, since empirically it is only a question of
preference in the use of language. A related pragma-
tic perspective underlies the legal concept of insan-
ity; this is the assumption that people will not be de-
terred from law violation by being held responsible
for their deeds if their mental capacities are so
defective as to prevent their realistically anticipating
government reactions to their conduct. Application of
the insanity concept is plagued, however, by una-
voidable imprecision in identifying this incapacity
and specifying the degree of mental defect that
warrants suspension of responsibility. '
In most modern societies, coordinated activity in
the day-to-day operations of economic, political and
other institutions seems to reflect the gratification or
unpleasantness that participants expect from alterna-
tive modes of behavior. Anticipations from conduct
may be affected by ideas of right and wrong, but they
apparently are especially influenced by the personal
approval or disapproval of close associates and by the
tangible consequences that actions are thought to
yield, such as material benefit, promotion, physical
injury or arrest and punishment. The family, school
and church strive to influence personal ideas and
feelings to mold conduct, while employers dispense
pay, recognition and authority to shape job perform-
ance; paradoxically, they may all at times be said to
be determinants of behavior by holding people
responsible for actions as though each has free will.
PREDICTABILITY AND CRIMINOLOGY
As William James pointed out: "Free-will prag-
matically means novelties in the world, the right to
expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its
surface phenomena, the future may not identically
repeat and imitate the past." 6 Human conduct
would be completely determined before it occurs if
thought, hence anticipations of the consequences of
alternative possible decisions in new situations, were
fully shaped by prior learning. Behavior may involve
originality and creativity, however, hence be not fully
'For a fuller discussion see D. GLASER, HANDBOOK OF
C RIMINOLOGY, Chap. 2 (1974).
'W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM, Lecture 3 (1925).
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determined, because: (1) each new situation in which
thought guides conduct may pose some problems that
are unique, either objectively or as experienced in the
life histories of the participants; (2) thought about
our behavior-before, after and sometimes during
overt conduct-involves verbal interpretation of al-
ternative possibilities in imaginary role-taking, to
reenact and reinterpret our past behavior and that of
others mentally, and to complete acts in fantasy; (3)
these processes of imaginary role-taking can occa-
sionally be truly creative, with more or less new
construals of events and new lines of action emerging
from them. This type of analysis of the simultaneous
elements of determinacy and indeterminacy in
human thought and conduct is blurred rather than
illuminated by such labels as "soft" or "moderate"
determinism; thought always has much determina-
tion by the input of learning from experience,
especially through the verbal formulations in which
we learn to think,7 but it also has, at times, some free
creativity in its output.
The more complex and the more rapidly changing
a society becomes, the greater is the diversity of
behavior that people may consider pursuing and of
verbal interpretation that they may use when consid-
ering it, hence the greater their prospects for creativi-
ty in conduct. Predictability of human behavior is
somewhat limited by this possible creativity in the
thought that guides it, and even more by the
imprecision with which the determinants of human
conduct can be identified and measured. Therefore,
while prediction is imperfect in all science, it is
especially restricted in the social and behavioral
sciences. Nevertheless, as textbooks reveal, these
disciplines have many well-validated generalizations.
Not only are the causal connections by which the
determinations of conduct are said to occur always
inferred rather than directly observed, but as Kuhn
points out, major alterations of conceptual para-
digms for inferring causal connection occur periodi-
cally in all fields of science. 8 Difficulties in precise
assessment, however, often permit several alternative
causal concepts to be prevalent simultaneously in the
scientific literature on any topic; this is a condition
especially pervasive in the study of human conduct.
While all these impediments reduce precision and
consensus in the social and behavioral sciences
generally, criminology is furthei handicapped by the
'A theme illuminated in Mills, Language, Logic and
Culture, 4 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 670 (1939), reprinted
in COLLECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3.
'T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLU-
TIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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fact that it applies these sciences (1) to study conduct
declared criminal through the highly variable and
imperfectly predictable actions of legislatures and
courts and (2) to study the criminal justice system.
Thus there are ample grounds for dissatisfaction
with the state of criminological knowledge to which
the problem of free will is quite extraneous. Never-
theless, there are many compendia of more or less
well-validated deterministic conclusions in crimino-
logy. ,
Perhaps the primary source of dissatisfaction with
criminological knowledge is an unrealistic expecta-
tion that it should have sweeping generalizations on
causes and means of correcting or preventing all
crime. It is quite certain that almost any empirically
testable statement about all crime will be found
invalid for some offenses or offenders, since the acts
legally defined as crime as well as their correlates are
so diverse. Nevertheless, much order can be found in
an overview of current criminological knowledge and
much progress in combating crime can result from
this, especially if we distinguish predatory from
nonpredatory offenses and nomothetic from idio-
graphic knowledge.
Predatory crimes are those that grow out of torts,
when the victims of injury by others succeed in
getting the state to punish those who have wronged
them. The statutes against such offenses (e.g.,
assault, theft, fraud) are occasionally reformulated
but hardly ever long repealed, and they are expand-
ing at a rapid rate (e.g., in new criminal laws
punishing polluters, contaminators, cheaters of con-
sumers, and violators of civil rights). On the other
hand, laws against nonpredatory conduct (e.g., pros-
titution, abortion, drug use, homosexuality, and
formerly heresy, witchcraft and political dissent) are
on the whole decreasing, though some have a cyclical
resurgence, because of growing tolerance for diversity
in lifestyles that do not injure others, and increasing
recognition that use of the criminal justice system to
prohibit adults from voluntary and private acts that
satisfy their cravings (e.g., for sex, alcohol or other
drugs) does little to reduce the prevalence of these
acts, fosters predatory crime, tends to corrupt the
criminal justice system, and thus is more costly to
society than coping with these cravings primarily
through the public health and education systems. 10
Idiographic knowledge consists of generalizations
9
See, e.g., D. GLASER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY
(1974) and STRATEGIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING,
DHEW Publication No. (ADM) 75-195; T. HIRscHI,
CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY (1969).
1 The themes of this paragraph are more fully developed
in STRATEGIC CRIMINAL.JUSTICE PLANNING, supra note 9.
that can be valid only for a more or less definite era
and place in history, while nomothetic knowledge is
comprised of statements applicable to aspects or
classifications of events in all times and cultures. In
either case, the validity is not absolute but probabil-
istic; assertions on a category of human conduct may
be both empirically testable and demonstrably true
for the entire category only if they are generalizations
on the predominant pattern of relationships, unless
they are true merely by the relationship of a set of
definitions, as the statement "Man is a featherless
biped." Most of our knowledge on types of crime and
on the criminal justice system consists of idiographic
accounts of predominant statistical trends and cor-
relations in our society in recent decades.
The most valid, useful and cumulative criminolog-
ical generalizations are deductions from abstract
nomothetic laws in the behavioral and social sciences,
such as: (1) behavior that has been rewarding tends
to be repeated even if punished, unless alternative
behavior proves more rewarding than the punished
behavior; (2) social separation fosters cultural differ-
entiation. "x If research is concentrated on ways of
applying such universally valid statistical laws to
combating property crime by increasing the legiti-
mate rewards accessible to offenders through employ-
ment, and by reducing the isolation of delinquents
from law-abiding and gratifying adult social worlds,
then two really central problems in criminology will
be addressed, both theoretically and practically.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Both free will and determinism are socially derived
linguistic representations of reality, free will to
justify holding people morally responsible for their
conduct, and determinism to explain or predict and
hence to rationalize attempting to influence or
control behavior. Both perspectives contribute to
coordinated action in a society and both are used by
all people, but in different contexts: free will in moral
assessment and determinism in causal explanation.
Indeed, the assumption that human actions can be
shaped by rewards and punishments paradoxically
implies both free will to choose that which is
gratifying over that which is unpleasant in its
consequences, and the determination of behavior by
those who can affect its rewards and penalties.
The necessary connection in deterministic expla-
nations as well as the free will assumption in moral
"For fuller discussion of the research implications of
this perspective on criminology see Glaser, Achieving
Better Questions: A Half-century's Progress in Correc-
tional Research, 39 FED. PROBATION 3 (Sept. 1975).
19761
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assessments are based on inferences rather than on
direct observation, yet a sense of choosing freely
among alternative possible forms of conduct is
introspectively observable in the imaginary role-tak-
ing and inner conversation that occurs when we
think about our behavior. That there is much
determination of conduct and thought by our prior
experiences is evident in the correlation of behavior
with cultural contacts, yet some creativity is indicated
by the view of thought and action as emergent from
covert role-taking.
Despite the increasing rate of behavioral innova-
tion in this era of rapid change and cultural mixture,
much verifiable and useful generalization can be and
has been achieved in the scientific study of human
conduct. Such knowledge includes the description
and analysis of criminal law violation and of the
criminal justice system. The central problem' in
enhancing the utility of this criminology is not free
will, but that of developing and testing nomothetic
propositions derived from the validated abstract
principles of the behavioral and social sciences.
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